tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-35658622.post3651722292132257488..comments2023-11-18T08:09:26.056+13:00Comments on Abandoned Footnotes: Rawlsian Legislatures: A Modest ProposalXavier Marquezhttp://www.blogger.com/profile/10099356104979121153noreply@blogger.comBlogger2125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-35658622.post-69187441159458313402012-08-11T16:54:33.108+12:002012-08-11T16:54:33.108+12:00Thanks Jeff. I like the point about risk aversion ...Thanks Jeff. I like the point about risk aversion - it had not occurred to me. Re the representation of minorities - I would say that this would depend on how the system would be specifically structured. It seems to me that, at least some variants of this would lead to probabilistic "minority vetos."<br /><br />Here's a potential example. Suppose 70% of constituencies favor option A, and 30% favor option B. Given a reasonable level of loss aversion, the optimal policy for re-election seeking legislators is not to target option A exclusively, but some compromise between A and B that would be more or less publicly justifiable to the constituencies favoring B. After all, they have a nonzero chance of drawing a B-constituency.<br /><br />In Rawls this sort of problem is solved, it seems to me, by the requirement of consensus. (Any reasonable - that is, cooperation-seeking - minority is able to reject a deal negotiated by their representative, so the negotiators end up only seeking deals that cannot be reasonably rejected by anyone). But of course while that makes sense for Rawls' thought experiment, it would make no sense for an actual legislature.Xavier Marquezhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/10099356104979121153noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-35658622.post-84032122281405606292012-08-11T09:08:23.072+12:002012-08-11T09:08:23.072+12:00This is quite intriguing. I've generally found...This is quite intriguing. I've generally found the argument that the difference principle assumes universal perfect risk aversion compelling, and lacking a solution given that individually differentiated levels of risk aversion would themselves be unknown in the original position. In this case, we might overcome that problem in that the legislators would have to choose positions that would be suitable for a wide range of risk aversion preferences.<br /><br />But I would also have to question the representation of minorities in this system. The rational strategy for legislators would be to select policies that cater to the modal constituency or voter; there is no motivation to be concerned with others. That, I think, is a problem with Rawls generally: he's too concerned with the universal at the expense of the diverse. This system works as an implementation of Rawls' thought experiment, certainly. But I think it also demonstrates one of the flaws of that approach.Jeff Johnsonhttps://twitter.com/the_other_jeffnoreply@blogger.com